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 Business Cycles: A Role for Imperfect
Competition in the Banking System.
1 Introduction
A variety of theoretical models and ample empirical evidence support the
existence of countercyclical markups in real goods markets.1 In turn, these
countercyclical markups constitute an important internal propagation mech-
anism in business cycle models. This paper is concerned with ﬁnancial mar-
kets, for which practically no work on the cyclicality of the markups exists.
The questions this paper addresses are:
1- Is there a countercyclical pattern in ﬁnancial markups?
2- If yes, what generates this pattern?
3- What are the implications of these countercyclical markups for the real
economy?
To test the ﬁrst assertion, I use bank data across 124 countries for the
years 1990-2000. I use dynamic panel techniques to confront the poten-
tial bias induced by simultaneity or reverse causation, and examine whether
the exogenous component of GDP growth negatively aﬀects bank markups.
Since past work shows that long-run economic growth is a good predictor of
ﬁnancial development that enhances competition and thus erodes markups,
I control for a three-year average of ﬁnancial development to isolate the busi-
ness cycle component.
To assess the strength of an independent link between the markups and
the business cycle, I use various conditioning variables that include a proxy
for concentration, overhead costs (operative and administrative costs), inﬂa-
tion volatility, and changes in real interest rates. The results remain robust to
any of these factors. The countercyclical behavior of the markups vanishes,
however, when controlling for the entry of foreign banks, which happens to
be highly procyclical.
I rely on this last result to support my hypothesis regarding the second
question. In the last decade, banks have expanded internationally by estab-
lishing foreign subsidiaries and branches or by taking over established banks.
1For instance, see Pigou (1927), Keynes (1939), Rotemberg and Saloner (1986), Rotem-
berg and Woodford (1992), Chevallier and Sharfstein (1996), Galeotti and Schiantarelli
(1998) among many others.
1It is well-documented that foreign entry initially occurs at the wholesale
level, but with the ﬁnal intention to spread to the retail niches.2 There-
fore, we can predict that the threat of foreign banks encroaching on retail
markets may induce greater eﬃciency of the established banks at the retail
level. The penetration into the retail sector is obstructed, however, by the
need to incur large sunk entry costs (for instance, large advertisement ex-
penditures or the construction of a network of branches and ATMs required
to accommodate small transactions). This implies that banks need to enter
at a minimum-eﬃcient-scale (MES) to justify the sunk costs incurred. In
turn, it follows that right after entering they must capture a large enough
fraction of the market to make the constructed network proﬁtable. This is
particularly diﬃcult in the banking industry since the markets are highly
segmented into regional or sectorial niches (Petersen and Rajan, 1994). In
this scenario, the size of the market constitutes a barrier to entry. If the
relevant ﬁnancial market is small or underdeveloped there is space for only
few incumbents working at an eﬃcient scale. Thus, during recessions, the
banks in the local ﬁnancial system are able to exert their monopolistic power
by charging high markups. In contrast, boom periods lead to an expansion
of the ﬁnancial system that attracts potential competitors who can operate
at an eﬃcient scale. In this situation, contestable markets force incumbents
to charge markups well below short-run proﬁt maximizing levels to avoid
entry. As shown in Bain (1956), pricing decisions strongly inﬂuence ﬁrms
contemplating entry and justify limit-pricing strategies that are counter to
short run proﬁt maximization. With this idea in mind, I extend the empirical
analysis to show that the competitive pressure of entry is short-lived. The
aim is to show that foreign entry aﬀects markups by triggering pricing strate-
gies among incumbents rather than by transforming an existent monopolistic
market structure.
Regarding the third question, the cyclicality of the markups may help to
explain evidence that suggests an important role for ﬁnancial development in
the magnitude of the business cycle 3. If bank markups are countercyclical,
then there is a bank-supply channel that extends the credit channel to rein-
force the same vicious circle: Credit is more expensive during recessions, and
ﬁrms and households postpone investment and work decisions and make the
recession deeper. But while the standard version of the credit channel relies
2See Claessens et al (2001).
3For a Survey, see Gertler and Hubbard (1988).
2on an external ﬁnance problem that induces banks to charge a premium to
cover the increasing expected bankruptcy costs during recessions, the bank-
supply channel is solely the result of imperfect competition in the banking
system. This channel may be particularly relevant in developing countries,
in which bank credit remains the primary source of funds for entrepreneurs.
The last section of this paper develops a dynamic stochastic general equilib-
rium model that is designed to highlight the macro implications of the limit
pricing scheme that constitutes the bank-supply channel. The microfoun-
dations of the banking system embedded in the general equilibrium setup
account for several features of the data.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I discuss the methodology
to measure bank markups and provide a literature review. In section 3, I
present the empirical results. In section 4, I introduce the theoretical model.
Concluding remarks are in section 5.
2 Markups Measurement and Literature Re-
view
The ﬁrst step in answering the three questions posed is to ﬁnd a proper
measure for markups in the banking industry data. A simple approach is to
consider the ex-ante (posted) spreads or the diﬀerence between lending and
deposits rate, as a proxy for ﬁnancial markups. The diﬃc u l t yh e r ei st h a tt h e
spreads include a risk premium to cover expected borrowers’ bankruptcy costs
that increase during recessions and cause the spread to be countercyclical.
However, we expect that, in the long run, aggregate bank income obtained
from such risk premium charges match banks’ loan default costs. Therefore, I
use annual bank balance sheet ex-post data that accounts for defaulted loans
to proxy for net markups. In particular, I use net interest margins (NIM),
equal to bank’s total interest income minus interest expense over total assets
after subtracting defaulted loans. Other issues remain though. Some of the
loan contracts are settled for even longer periods of time and at predeter-
mined rates. It may be the case that during recessions, riskier entrepreneurs
facing liquidity constraints are more prone to demand credit. Higher margins
would reﬂect the premium obtained for new riskier loans that would not nec-
essarily fall in default during the year in consideration. Nonetheless, defaults
3are much more likely to occur in recessions. Following this line of argument,
if a particular bank liked to enter into long-term contracts at predetermined
rates, one would expect that the default frequency for all its loans would
signiﬁcantly increase during recessions, driving down its net interest income
and oﬀsetting any positive eﬀect from the new loans. To sum up, evidence of
increasing margins in bad times would provide support to my idea of coun-
tercyclical markups. As explained in Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1998),
bank interest margins can be seen as an indicator of the pure ineﬃciency of
the banking system.
P r a c t i c a l l ya l lt h ee x i s t e n tl i t e r a t u r ei sf o c u s e do ne x - a n t es p r e a d s .R e -
lated to this paper, Hannan and Berger (1991) ﬁnd that after a monetary
contraction ex-ante spreads tend to increase more in regional U.S. markets
in which the banking industry is more concentrated.4 In addition, Angellini
and Cetorelli (2003) consider the growth of GDP as an additional control
variable in the estimation of Lerner indexes for the Italian banking indus-
try, ﬁnding a negative association. However, they do not settle the issues of
causality and endogeneity.
Although the cyclicality of the markups does not receive particular atten-
tion, there is an enormous literature on bank structure and eﬃciency. This
literature contains ambiguous results. In a survey Rhoades (1977) expresses
“disbelief and frustration” in the overall inability to link concentration and
eﬃciency. New surveys and studies reach the same conclusions.5 Contra-
dictory results must be preceded by contradictory theories. The intuition of
the Structure-Conduct-Performance (S-C-P) hypothesis is straightforward:
A more concentrated market lowers the costs of collusion and fosters tacit or
explicit collusion on the part of the banks. In contrast, the Eﬃcient-Structure
(E-S) hypothesis predicts eﬃciency gains from market consolidation. Firms
possessing a comparative advantage in production become large and, as a
natural consequence, the market becomes more concentrated. Such cost dif-
ferences may be due to diﬀerences in technological or managerial skills. The
eﬀect is ampliﬁed because of large economies of scale existent in the bank
industry. They are derived from risk diversiﬁcation, lower average adminis-
4See also Edwards and Vegh (1997) and Olivero (2004) for additional references.
5More contradictive results are found in Berger and Hannan (1989); Neumark and
Sharpe (1992); Smirlock (1985); Grady and Kyle (1979). For a new survey, see Bank
for International Settlements 2001. In a worldwide analysis Demirguc-Kunt et al (2003)
found, at the same time, high net interest margins associated with both small banks and
banks with a large market share.
4trative costs (Demsetz 1973), and the eﬃcient use of large sunk costs like the
construction of large networks of branches and ATM’s (Cerasi et al, 1997).
Additionally, Gilligan et al (1984) provide evidence that banking is char-
acterized by economies of scope from joint production of ﬁnancial services.
Finally, in the absence of restrictions on entry, excessive ineﬃcient proﬁts are
precluded (Baumol, 1982). These conclusions led to a new literature aimed at
ﬁnding evidence of eﬃciency gains resulting from mergers and acquisitions.
T h er e s u l t sa r e ,o n c ea g a i n ,a m b i g u o u sa n di n c o n c l u s i v e . 6
Results regarding bank entry deregulation and eﬃciency are instead mostly
unambiguous and conclusive. Several surveys hold that new legislations that
remove substantial entry barriers and expose national banking markets to
potential new entrants produce pro-competitive eﬀects and reduce margins.
Besides, banks lose market power following ﬁnancial liberalization even in if
the banking industry remains highly concentrated.7
A more interesting result about deregulation is related to the timing of
the eﬃciency gains. In a study of over 80 countries, Claessens et al (2001)
ﬁnd that foreign bank entry is signiﬁcantly associated with a reduction in do-
mestic bank proﬁtability. However, the impact of foreign bank entry on local
bank competition is “..felt immediately upon entry decision is taken rather
after they have gained substantial market share.” Angelini and Cetorelli
(2003) ﬁnd that net interest margins declined sharply immediately after a
banking reform was made eﬀective in Italy. Similarly, Shaﬀer (1993) ana-
lyzes the impact of the Bank Act Revisions in Canada and ﬁnds evidence of
an “unexpected supercompetitive state” right after entry deregulation, with
negative bank markups observed. The author concludes that such atypical
outcome “.. is not consistent with long run equilibrium behavior under known
static or dynamic models of proﬁt maximization; and it may simply reﬂect a
temporary disequilibrium...(which) may warrant further study.” These last
three studies resemble my hypothesis of limit pricing.
To summarize, the evidence ﬁts well with my limit-pricing hypothesis:
a) Bank spreads are more countercyclical in concentrated markets; b) When
bank systems are exposed to potential competition, eﬃciency gains are im-
6See for instance, Focarelli et al (1999), Petersen and Rajan (1994).
7For a survey see Vives (1991) and Demirguc-Kunt (1998). Also Spiller and Favaro
(1984) focus on the pro-competitive impact of the relaxation of entry restrictions in the
Uruguayan industry, concluding that collusive strategic interactions across banks signiﬁ-
cantly decrease after the regulatory reform. Ribon and Yosha (1999) reach similar con-
clusions for the Israeli banking industry.
5mediately observed and occur long before any change in the market structure
is registered c) There exists an ambiguous and contradicting relationship be-
tween concentration and eﬃciency. That is, my hypothesis predicts that
incumbents experience periods of monopolistic markups (i.e. recessions) fol-
lowed by periods in which the eﬃciency gains from consolidation and ex-
ploitation of economies of scale and scope prevail (i.e. booms).
3 Evidence on Markups and Foreign Entry
I construct an unbalanced panel from several data sources. The resulting
sample covers 124 countries during the years 1990-2000. Bank structure
information is taken from Scope Database provided by IBCA, which contains
data for 137 countries. To ensure reasonable coverage, only countries with
at least three banks in a given year are included. Coverage by IBCA is
comprehensive, accounting for roughly 90% of the assets of banks in each
country. Each country has its own data template that allows for diﬀerences
in account conventions. However, these are converted to a format which is a
globally standardized template derived from the country-speciﬁc templates.
In the regressions, I control for unobserved time-invariant country-speciﬁc
eﬀects to account for the minor diﬀerences in the valuation of assets that
necessarily remain.
Measures of the activity of ﬁnancial intermediaries are taken from the
Levine-Loayza-Beck Data Set. Macroeconomic data comes from the Penn
World Table 6.1 (PWT 6.1.). Data on real interest rates is taken from the
World Development Indicators 2002. Variable deﬁnitions and a few descrip-
tive statistics are provided in the statistical appendix. The degree of ﬁnancial
development captured by the ratio of Private Credit/ GDP is signiﬁcantly
larger in developed countries than in developing ones. On average, margins
are 571 bp (5.71%) for developing countries and 268 bp (2.68%) for developed
ones. Besides, these are much more volatile in developing economies. Poorer
countries also have a relatively high degree of concentration and foreign pen-
etration.
Econometric Methodology The aggregation of time series would ob-
scure underlying microeconomic dynamics, whereas panel data techniques
6allow for the investigation of heterogeneity in adjustment dynamics between
diﬀerent types of countries.
The estimation procedure needs to tackle some important issues. As men-
tioned, I must allow for the presence of unobserved country-speciﬁce ﬀects
that are correlated with the regressors. Besides, most of the explanatory
variables in the speciﬁcations to be used (e.g. GDP growth rates, private
credit, etc.) are determined jointly with the dependent variable (i.e. net
interest margins). Therefore, I must also allow and control for joint endo-
geneity. To confront these issues I use a GMM in diﬀerences speciﬁcation
that controls for endogeneity by using internal instruments (i.e. instruments
based on lagged values of the explanatory variables).
However, other concerns remain. I need to use a dynamic speciﬁcation to
allow for the inertia in the dependent variable that is likely to be present in
the annual balance-sheet information. In this scenario, lagged levels of the
variables are weak instruments for the regressions in diﬀerences. Therefore, I
proceed with an auto-regressive dynamic model and use a relatively eﬃcient
GMM system speciﬁcation that adds equations in levels to the ones in dif-
ferences. In this case, the instruments are given by the lagged diﬀerences of
the corresponding variables.
In addition, the small sample size raises a concern for overﬁtting bias. For
robustness, I alternate the number of lags used as instruments and restrict the
quantity of explanatory variables in the estimations. For further reference,
a detailed explanation of all the econometric methodology to be used in this
s t u d yc a nb ef o u n di nA r e l l a n oa n dB o n d (1991), Blundell and Bond (1997)
and Bond (2002).
The dynamic speciﬁcation consists on an autoregressive-distributed lag
model:
yit = αyi,t−1+βxit+(ηi+εit) | α |< 1 i =1 ,2,...,N; t =2 ,3,...,T.
(1)
Where yit denotes net interest margins (NIM) for country i in period t.
xit is a vector of current and lagged values of additional explanatory variables
and is assumed to be endogenous. ηi is an stochastic unobserved country-
speciﬁct i m e - i n v a r i a n te ﬀect. εit is a disturbance term that is assumed to
be serially uncorrelated and independent across individuals. For robustness,
time dummies are included to account for time-speciﬁce ﬀects.
7Net interest Margins -Time Series Properties- I ﬁrst consider a
very simple AR(1) speciﬁcation. The ﬁrst two columns of Table 2 report
OLS levels and Within Group estimates of the auto-regressive parameter α,
along with heteroskedasticity-consistent estimates of the asymptotic stan-
dard errors. For panels (like this one) in which the number of time periods
available is small, standard results for omitted variable bias indicate that the
OLS estimator is biased upwards and the within groups one is biased down-
wards.8 Therefore, a consistent candidate estimator must lie between the
OLS and within groups estimates. However, the diﬀerenced GMM estimator
is found to be signiﬁcantly below the lower bound indicated by the within
groups estimator. These downward biases in diﬀerenced GMM estimates of
the AR(1) are consistent with the ﬁnite sample biases expected in the case
of highly persistent series. The preferred speciﬁcation is clearly the GMM
system estimator. With the introduction of the equations in levels, I obtain a
remarkable improvement in the precision of the parameter estimates. The re-
sults indicate a large degree of persistence in the net interest margins (.728).
The inertia may arise from lagged eﬀects of the explanatory variables, which
is to be expected in balance sheets data with annual frequency. We can also
observe that the assumption that the disturbances are serially uncorrelated
cannot be rejected. As this model is overidentiﬁed, I use the Sargan statistic
to test the validity of the overidentifying restrictions. In this case, I obtain
a chi-square statistic, which gives the reported p-value of 0.123. The null
hypothesis that these moment conditions are valid is not rejected at any con-
ventional level, consistent with the ﬁrst and second order serial correlations
tests for ﬁrst-diﬀerenced residuals.
Basic Model A simple approach, and a ﬁrst step, in studying the pat-
tern of the margins throughout the business cycle is to include GDP growth
in the AR(1) model. Prior to presenting the results, I would like to clarify the
interpretation.To the extent that the assumptions regarding the instruments
employed are correct, the econometric methodology is designed to isolate the
eﬀect of the exogenous component of the explanatory variable on the interest
margins. Hereafter, when I mention the impact or eﬀect of a given variable
on the margins, I am referring to this isolated exogenous component and not
8If T is small, the within transformation induces a non-negligible negative correlation
between the transformed lagged dependent variable yi,t−1− 1
T−1(yi1+..+yit+...+yi,T−1)
and the transformed error term εi,t−1 − 1
T−1(εi2 + .. + εi,t−1 + ... + εi,T).
8merely describing the association between them. In Table 3, GROWTH has
ah i g h l ys i g n i ﬁcant and negative eﬀect on the margins despite their persis-
tence. According to the preferred system speciﬁc a t i o n ,a ni n c r e a s ei ni n c o m e
of 10% causes the margins to fall by approximately 1% (100 bp) on impact.
The literature presents extensive evidence of a strong link between long-
r u ne c o n o m i cg r o w t ha n dﬁnancial development. It may be that ﬁnancial
development that enhances competition explains the negative relationship
mentioned above. In order to assess and control for ﬁnancial development,
I include a three-year-overlapping average of private credit oﬀered by com-
mercial banks (PRIV.CRED (avg)) in the conditional set.9 Notice that by
computing averages of this dependent variable we are artiﬁcially construct-
ing a persistent series that should not be aﬀected by short-run ﬂuctuations.
Finite sample bias is therefore expected in the diﬀerenced speciﬁcation. In
contrast, the preferred system speciﬁcation shows this variable to have a
signiﬁcant and sizeable negative eﬀect on the margins. GROWTH remains
signiﬁcantly at a 10% level though with a slightly lower coeﬃcient. This
result supports the hypothesis of ﬂuctuating margins at a business cycle fre-
quency.
Sensitivity analysis I use various conditioning information sets to as-
sess the strength of the countercyclical nature of the margins depicted in the
basic model. I start by introducing a proxy for concentration as a control
variable, the assets of the three largest banks as a share of the assets of all the
commercial banks in the system. The variable is signiﬁcant and again enters
with a negative sign. Refer to Table 4. These results support the implica-
tions of the E-S hypothesis which predicts operational eﬃciency gains from
banking consolidation. The large number of explanatory variables accompa-
nied by a relative large p-value for the Sargan test estimates raises a concern
about overﬁtting bias. However, no clear pattern in the coeﬃcient estimates
is observed when reducing or increasing the number of instruments.
If the negative eﬀect of concentration on margins is explained by eﬃciency
gains, I would expect this impact to vanish when controlling for operating
costs. Therefore, I expand the conditioning set and include overhead costs
(OVERCOSTS). They are deﬁned as personnel expenses (mostly wages) and
other non interest expenses divided by the total bank assets in the local bank




As expected, large operating costs cause margins to increase. The variable
enters signiﬁcatively and with a sizeable positive coeﬃcient. In support to
the E-S hypothesis, the inclusion of this variable causes the concentration
coeﬃcient to become insigniﬁcant and small in sign. Although the size of
GROWTH is reduced, this cyclical component remains signiﬁcant.
Saunders and Shumacher (2000) show that interest rate volatility, usually
observed in a context of high and variable inﬂation, is positively related to
margins. Thus, I proceed by adding inﬂation and real interest rates to the
conditioning set. Neither any of these variables turns out to be signiﬁcant,
nor explain the cyclicality of the markups. See Table 4 again.10
The Role of Foreign Entry Up to this point, I have shown that the
exogenous cyclical component of economic growth is negatively associated
with net interest margins. Moreover, this link is not due to potential biases
induced by omitted variables (including that derived from unobserved coun-
try speciﬁce ﬀects), simultaneity, or reverse causation. In the next step, I test
the main hypothesis proposed in the paper. That is, countercyclical markups
are the result of a limit pricing strategy aimed at deterring procyclical en-
try of competitors in a segmented local ﬁnancial system. As I explained in
the introduction, although the threat of entry is a non-measurable concept,
foreign penetration may be considered a good proxy for it. Consequently, I
would expect the negative association between margins and economic growth
to vanish when controlling for foreign entry.
Thus, I introduce foreign entry in the conditioning set. The covariate
ForeignBanks refers to the number of foreign banks divided by the total
number of banks in a given country. Foreign bank entry is measured as a
change in foreign bank presence (i.e. ∆ForeignBanksit). The ﬁrst experi-
ment, not reported here, consisted in introducing ∆ForeignBanksit into the
extended model presented in the last subsection. Its inﬂuence turns out to
be negligible and statistically insigniﬁcant. The results are diﬀerent when
10It is puzzling to observe that the coeﬃcients for GROWTH and PRIV.CRED (avg)
actually increase when these covariates are included to the conditioning set. It may be the
result of money-based disinﬂation programs being accompanied by short-lived recessions.
These events would imply, at the same time, higher margins due to the recession but lower
margins and more credit availability resulting from stable and low inﬂation. Thus, if we
do not control for inﬂation, we would expect margins to be less countercyclical and less
sensible to variables linked with growth indicators.
10Ic o n s i d e r∆ForeignBanksi,t−1. I tm a yb et h ec a s et h a tt h eb e g i n n i n go f
wholesale operations occurs some time after the oﬃcial entry registration
occurs. Thus, if limit pricing exists, it happens one year after the entry de-
cision is eﬀectively taken. These results may also provide support for the
supposition that entry occurs at a wholesale level and then spreads to retail
niches with a time lag.
In order to understand the notation, notice that in this last case the
proposed model is:
yit = αyi,t−1+βxit+γ∆ForeignBanks i,t−1+(ηi+εit) i =1 ,2,...,N; t =2 ,3,...,T.
(2)
where yit is the dependent variable, xit any of the controlling sets already
introduced, and ∆ForeignBanksi,t−1 = ForeignBanksi,t−1−ForeignBanksi,t−2.
Alternatively, (2) can be expressed as:
yit = αyi,t−1+βxit+γ1ForeignBanks i,t−1+γ2ForeignBanksi,t−2+(ηi+εit).
(3)
Where γ1 = −γ2.
With this procedure I would like to eliminate the possibility that the
negative eﬀect on margins is a consequence of pro-eﬃciency gains from a
larger presence of foreign banks in the local ﬁnancial structure. In other
words, if the results are driven by entry we expect the coeﬃcients, γ1 and γ2,
preceding ForeignBanks i,t−1 and ForeignBanksi,t−2 to be signiﬁcant and
of the same magnitude, but with opposite signs (i.e. the ﬁrst one negative
and the second one positive). In contrast, if the results are driven by the
presence of foreign banks, γ2, must either be negative or at least small. That
is, the long-run or steady state eﬀect (γ1 + γ2)/1 − α should signiﬁcantly
diﬀer from zero.
Once again, the results do not reject my hypothesis. Refer to Table 5.
The two coeﬃcients are opposite in sign and do not signiﬁcantly diﬀer in
absolute value. These lagged variables not only exert a signiﬁcant nega-
tive eﬀect on the margins, but also break down the independent impact of
11GROWTH by turning it small and insigniﬁcant. The remarkable colinearity
of the covariates involved, aﬀects the statistical signiﬁcance of all of them.
To conclude, the pro-competitive eﬀect of entry in the local banking system
is short-lived and vanishes after one year.
4T h e o r e t i c a l m o d e l
In this section I present a simple general equilibrium model designed to high-
light the role of the proposed bank-supply channel in the economy. I start
from a standard DSGE Real Business Cycle model with variable labor supply
in the spirit of Hansen (1985). Then, I introduce imperfect competition with
limit pricing in the ﬁnancial system. This modiﬁcation creates a disinterme-
diation between borrowers and entrepreneurs that ampliﬁe st h er e s p o n s eo f
the real variables to technology shocks.
4.1 Households
The household sector is conventional. There is a continuum of households
of unit mass. Each household works, consumes, and invests its savings in
regular deposits.



















Subject to the budget constraint:
Ct + Dt+1 = WtNt +( 1+rt)Dt + Πt. (5)
Where Ct is consumption; Nt is labor supply; Wt denotes the real wage;
Dt are deposits (in real terms) held at commercial banks and (1 + rt) is the
gross real interest rate paid to depositors. Πt are real dividends payments
received from ownership of these ﬁnancial intermediaries.
124.1.1 Optimality Conditions
Household behavior obeys:















4.2 The Entrepreneurial Sector
Entrepreneurs construct capital in each period for use in the subsequent
period. Capital is used in combination with labor to produce output. En-
trepreneurs are risk neutral. Assuming CRS, Cobb-Douglas technology, the






where Yt is aggregate output, Kt−1 is the aggregate amount of capital
constructed by entrepreneurs in period t − 1, Nt is the labor input, and At
is an exogenous technology shock.





13Demand for New Capital The construction of new capital is determined
by the level of investment It. Thus, the capital stock obeys:
Kt = It +( 1− δ)Kt−1, (10)
where δ is the depreciation rate.
The gross return to holding one additional unit of capital from t to t+1,










Supply for New Capital In equilibrium, the allocation for capital satis-




where the real interest rate, (1 + rt+1), is the gross cost of funds absent
imperfect competition in the ﬁnancial system and (1 + Ξt+1) is the gross
markup charged by the intermediary bank. I assume that new equity and
bond issues are prohibitively expensive, or not available for local ﬁrms, so
that all investment ﬁnance is done with bank credit. I will ignore the presence
of the bank multiplier and the existence of reserves. Therefore, the overall
amount of credit in the economy must be equal to the overall amount of new
household deposits:
Dt+1 = It. (13)
4.3 The Resource Constraint
The resource constraint for the economy is:
Yt = Ct + It. (14)
144.4 The Banking System
I assume that the banking system is highly segmented into a large number,
n, of sectors or regions (niches).
T h es i z eo fe a c hn i c h ei st h es a m e ,a n de a c ho ft h e mi ss e r v e db ya ne s -
tablished bank (incumbent), i, that possesses a local monopoly and therefore
ﬁnances an equal fraction It
n of the total investment. Each incumbent can
serve only its own niche because of an implicit collusion agreement that is
described later.
This intermediary chooses a net markup for its niche, Ξt+1,a tt h eb e g i n -








The constant υi is the cost-eﬃciency level, and captures any idiosyn-
cratic operational (in)eﬃciency and information (dis)advantages any bank
may have. I assume that υi is drawn from a common uniform distribution
U(υ) with support on [0,λ], at the beginning of the bank operations. υi is
private information and is unknown to banks outside the niche.
The cost of serving the niche for each bank i depends on the amount of
credit ﬁnanced (the size of the market). In addition, the banking system pos-
sesses operational economies of scope and scale over operating costs. Thus,
I assume that 0 < τ < 1.
In period t +1the bank obtains the following ex-post real proﬁts for
carrying the bank contract at period t :



















The ﬁrst term are entrepreneur payments and the term in brackets cap-
tures the cost of funds (i.e. payments to depositors) plus operating costs.
15Using the fact that Dt+1 = It, and that Ξt+1rt+1 ≈ 0 for the parameter












Entry and mergers I assume that entry is possible in this banking
system, but that it occurs in successive stages. Entrants in the “banking
system” at time t only start competing in the “niche” at time t +1 , which
introduces a one-period time-to-build lag in the model. Right after the entry
decision is eﬀectively taken (when the sunk costs are incurred), the entrant is
already inside the banking system, but only at the “wholesale level.” Hence,
during period t, it is able to temporarily serve any of the n niches until it is
ﬁnally established in one of them in t +1 . T h ea i mi st oc a p t u r et h ei d e a
of entry taking place in the wholesale market ﬁrst with the ultimate goal of
spreading later to the retail segment (niches).11
T h ee n t r ys t a g e sa r ea sf o l l o w s :
(A) At the beginning of period t, a potential competitor, j, attempts to
enter the banking system. At no cost, it draws its cost-eﬃciency level, υj,
from the same common uniform distribution U(υ).
(B) After learning its own υj, the potential competitor chooses whether
to enter the banking system and ﬁght for one of the niches next period or
withdraw from the banking system. The closer υj is to zero, the more eﬃcient
the potential entrant is, and the easier to take over a niche. I will assume
that the number of total draws is large enough that at least some potential
competitors enter the banking system every period.
(C) To enter the banking system (and eventually ﬁght for one of the
niches) an outsider has to incur ﬁxed sunk entry costs, zt, at the beginning
11In addition, we could say that entrants need to incur in a one-period learning process
to make their idiosyncratic cost-eﬃciency level at the regional level eﬀective.
16Figure 1: Entry Stages
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of period t.12 zt is exogenous and measured in real output units. We can also
interpret changes in zt as changes in entry regulations.
(D) In principle, during period t, entrants are able to serve any (or even
all) of the n niches at the wholesale level until ﬁnally established in one of







where λ ≥ υi for every i; given the common uniform distribution U(υ)
with support on [0,λ]. As in Petersen and Rajan (1994), I assume that
retail banks that are physically closer to their customers have lower costs of
transacting with both ﬁrms and depositors.
12As I said, we can include in them advertisement costs or the construction of a network
of branches and ATMs.
17(E) For simplicity, I assume that any entrant is able to ﬁght for only one
niche (i.e. multi-sectorial entry is not possible). The collusion agreement de-
scribed later implies that the potential competitor knows the cost-eﬃciency
level distribution of the banking system, U(υ), but cannot infer the particular
υ0
is of each incumbent. Hence, entrants are indiﬀerent about the particular
niche to ﬁght for. I assume that once inside the banking system they ran-
domly choose which niche to enter at the end of period t.
( F )A tt h ev e r yb e g i n n i n go fp e r i o dt+1,t h ee n t r a n ti si n s i d et h en i c h e
an is able to learn the incumbent’s υi. Bertrand competition occurs and the
following proposition holds:
PROPOSITION 1 Under Bertrand competition, only two possible out-
comes are possible. If υj > υi, the entrant fails and is forced to merge. If
υj < υi the entrant successfully displaces the incumbent and forces it to
merge. The optimal strategy for the loser is to merge immediately and not to
c o m p e t e .T h eo n l yv i s i b l eo u t c o m ei st h ep o s s i b l ec h a n g eo ft h ei n c u m b e n ta t
the very beginning of t +1 .13
Proof. See Appendix B.
(G) If successful the new incumbent keeps the niche until it is hit by an
exit-inducing shock that occurs with probability δD ∈ (0,1) in every period.
For simplicity, I do not model endogenous exit that is not driven by the
afore mentioned Bertrand competition. The “death” shock is independent
of the bank’s eﬃciency level. I assume that an entrant immediately ﬁlls the
empty niche left by every dead bank. Right after drawing an eﬃciency level,
the entrant is able to use the network left by the dead bank (avoiding any
sunk costs as well as the time-to-build lag). The number of banks and the
frequency of “death” is high enough so that E(υi)=λ
2, and U(υ) nests the
cost-eﬃciency distribution of all incumbents in the ﬁnancial system.
Implicit Collusion Agreement and Limit Pricing I assume that
entrants are liquidity constrained and cannot make losses after incurring sunk
costs. In these circumstances, the incumbents’ pricing strategy, Ξt+1, must
ensure that none of the new competitors at the wholesale level can obtain
13By deﬁnition the point likelihood of υj = υi is null.
18any expected positive proﬁts if they decide to oﬀer a net markup below Ξt+1












Notice, however, that low cost-eﬃciency incumbents have the incentive to
“signal” their idiosyncratic eﬃciency to new entrants by oﬀering a markup
below the level that makes (19) hold as an equality (hereafter, the binding
limit). From (17), entrants in the banking system know that only more





make proﬁts. Therefore, these incumbents have incentives to oﬀer markups
levels somewhat below the binding limit in (19) to inﬂuence and redirect
entrants’ decisions toward less-eﬃcient niches. The higher is the amount of
entry in the banking system, the higher the incentives to protect the niche
by lowering current markups and proﬁts. In this scenario, incumbents would
“compete” to deter entry in their own niches. Instead, I assume that there
exists an implicit collusion agreement among the incumbents that enforces
the secrecy of the idiosyncratic cost-eﬃciency levels.
I assume that the implicit collusion agreement must necessarily satisfy all
the incumbents to be possible.15 Consequently, a cartel markup below the
binding level in (19) does not work. The uniform distribution with support
on [0,λ], and the assumption that n is very large, implies that such cartel
markup level can result in losses for members with cost-eﬃciency levels in the
neighborhood of λ. The negative proﬁts force defections from the agreement;
defections that actually reveal the high cost-eﬃciency level of those defectors.













14By assumption, the customers remain loyal to the local incumbent bank if the level of
the markup oﬀered is the same.
15I assume that a single defector can transform the tacit agreement into a an explicit
one. As in Rotemberg and Woodford (1992), I assume that such scenario carries incom-
mensurable legal sanctions for the members of the cartel.
19I fs o m eo ft h eb a n k sa t t e m p tt oc h a r g eam a r k u pb e l o wt h eb i n d i n g
limit, one of the members of the cartel immediately serves such niche at the
wholesale level. The punishment consists of establishing a price just below
the one chosen by the defector, Ξ
def
t+1 − ε (such that ε is negligible in size).
The resulting negative proﬁts for serving the niche under this condition are









I assume that, in principle, such punishment would take place only if there
is a single monopolistic bank serving the niche (so that Proposition 1 holds).
In other words, the cartel allows Bertrand competition to occur inside the
niche to guarantee a monopolistic structure in which the number of banks in
the banking system never exceeds n (one bank per niche). Finally, I assume
that the amount of entry and the exogenous exit inducing shock (positively
associated with the discount factor) is high enough so that incumbents are
better oﬀ when committing to the collusive level in (20).
Therefore, the pricing decision is the same in all niches. Since all the
niches are of the same size, we can interpret this relationship as the pricing
decision taken by the representative bank of this economy. Hence, for every
period t, expected proﬁts for each incumbent i are:






Equations (20) and (22) can be interpreted as follows: The greater the
aggregate investment, the bigger the size of all niches, and the higher the
competitive pressure of the new entrants. In turn, this forces the incumbent
to oﬀer lower markups. These countercyclical markups constitute the bank-
supply channel that propagates and ampliﬁes shocks to the economy.
Entry decision Banks are forward looking and correctly anticipate
their expected stream of proﬁts. After drawing a υj, a potential entrant
20decides to enter the banking system only if the expected post-entry present




















− zs > 0. (23)
Banks discount future proﬁts using the household’s stochastic discount
factor, adjusted for the probability of survival. The pre-entry probability of
“defeating” the incumbent and taking-over the niche is 1 −
υj
λ =P r ( υj <
E(υi)). Equations (23) and (22) imply that entry is procyclical (i.e. entry
increases when the amount of credit, purchase of new capital and the eco-
nomic activity are high). The larger the discount factor and the probability
of the exit-inducing shock, the stronger the procyclicality.
Entry is aﬀected by market regulation that alters the value of zt.16 Equa-
tion (23) implies that the higher is zt, the lower the resulting entry threshold
value of υj,a n dt h u st h el o w e rt h ea m o u n to fe n t r yi nt h eb a n k i n gs y s -
t e m( a n dv i c ev e r s a ) .B u tt h e n ,t h eh i g h e ri szt, the more likely entries are
successful when ﬁghting for the niche. These results are in line with the em-
pirical evidence that entry exerts a sizable impact in small, underdeveloped,
and regulated markets.
T h eg o v e r n m e n tc a ne ﬀectively prohibit entry in the banking system by
setting zt →∞ . In this case, countercyclical limit pricing is not necessary,
and incumbents are able to establish a standard collusive agreement.
4.5 Model Parametrization
The only distinctive aspect of the general equilibrium model relative to a
benchmark RBC setup is the limit pricing scheme in the ﬁnancial system,
characterized by equations (12) and (20). The former characterizes how im-
perfect competition in the ﬁnancial system inﬂuences capital demand. The
latter describes the limit pricing strategy chosen by the representative incum-
bent bank. If we restrict the net ﬁnancial markup Ξt+1 to zero in equation
16As in Ghironi and Melitz (2005), changes in sunk entry costs alter the free-entry
condition.
21(12), we eﬀectively shut oﬀ the bank-supply channel and the model reverts
to a conventional RBC model.
I set the quarterly discount factor β to 0.99 (which also pins down the
steady state quarterly real interest rate depositors receive since R = β
−1).
Average hours worked relative to total hours available are set equal to 1
3. I
set the elasticity of intertemporal-substitution, 1
γ, equal to one, and γn equal
to zero. Following Hansen (1985), I set the standard deviation of the pro-
ductivity innovations to 0.712. The capital share, α, is 0.36. The quarterly
depreciation, δ, is assigned the value of 0.025. From the descriptive statistics
for developing countries, I set the quarterly steady-state net ﬁnancial markup
equal to 142 basis points and choose τ =0 .70.
4.6 A Negative Technology Shock
I consider an unanticipated one percent decrease in technology to stress the
role of the bank-supply channel deepening a recession. I assume further
that the shock obeys a ﬁrst order auto-correlation process that persists at
the rate of 0.95 per quarter. In Figure 2, I plot the response of the eight
endogenous variables under both perfect and imperfect competition in the
ﬁnancial system. As I said, the former exactly resembles the basic RBC
speciﬁcation. In this case, there are no ﬁnancial markups and the natural or
wicksellian interest rate depositors and entrepreneurs face are the same.
In the competitive model, a negative technology shock reduces output,
factor productivity, and consumption today by more than in future periods.
Output and consumption fall today and return later to their original levels.
Households want to smooth their consumption and attempt to shift resources
away from future periods to the current period. For this reason, we would
expect the natural real interest rate to increase.
Investment demand goes down because the technology shock has de-
creased production. By itself, this pushes down the natural interest rate,
oﬀsetting the pressure that comes from households’ desire to substitute con-
sumption away from future periods. The net eﬀect of these counteracting
pressures is to slightly decrease the natural interest rate by just 7 basis points.
The results change with imperfect competition. The monopolistic inter-
mediary has the possibility of providing credit after charging a markup over
22the interest rate paid to depositors. The intermediary banks allow house-
holds to substitute consumption away from other periods toward this period
by substantially decreasing the interest rate paid on deposits. As a result,
consumption does not initially fall as much as in the competitive model. But
this relatively higher consumption lowers the marginal utility of income and
reduces work eﬀort even more.
A decrease in the labor input negatively aﬀects production and the pro-
ductivity of capital. This is the cause for an even lower demand for invest-
ment relative to the baseline case. Under perfect competition, a resulting
lower investment demand and lower interest rates paid to depositors would
be reﬂected in a sharp decrease in the interest rate entrepreneurs face. The
fact that investment falls and the ﬁnancial market shrinks causes the threat
of entry to decline, and higher markups are compatible with the limit pric-
ing scheme. The ﬁnancial markup increases 9.42% (13 bp) on impact. The
higher markup does not allow the costs of borrowing for entrepreneurs to fall
much, and thus, the optimal capital stock is smaller than in the competitive
case and the volatility of all real variables is higher.
4.7 Volatility and Welfare
Macroeconomic Variability and Sensitivity Analysis Quantita-
tive results presented in Tables 6 and 7 conﬁrm that the presence of monopoly
power and countercyclical markups in the banking sector ends up increasing
the volatility of all real variables relative to the simple RBC model. In the
RBC model, the standard deviation of output, consumption and investment
is 1.80, 0.52 and 5.74 respectively. With a monopolistic banking system, the
corresponding values for the same variables are 2.31, 0.70 and 12.08.
The role of τ is critical for the countercyclical nature of the markups. The
larger τ, the larger the banking economies of scale and the higher (lower) the
probability of outsiders operating at an eﬃcient scale in a booming (reces-
sionary) economy. In turn, this causes the incumbent to set relatively lower
(higher) markups. As expected, in Table 8 we can observe how the volatility
of real variables monotically increases when τ increases.
Welfare Results To measure how the welfare of the representative
household is aﬀected by the presence of monopolistic power in the banking
system, I solve the model using a second-order approximation as in Collard
23and Juilliard (2001). Otherwise, conventional linearization can generate ap-
proximation errors that may be the cause of possible welfare reversals (see
Kim and Kim, 2003 for details). The welfare criterion considered here is
based on a second-order Taylor expansion of the representative household’s

























Where ¯ C and ¯ N are the steady-state values of consumption and labor and
hats denote percentage deviations from the steady state. In evaluating the
welfare criterion, I ﬁnd that the percent increase in steady-state consumption
that would make the household as well oﬀ as it would be with perfect compe-
tition in the banking system is 10.23%. A monopolistic environment aﬀects
welfare of the household through two diﬀerent channels. Firstly, the ﬁnan-
cial markup generates a permanent disintermediation between borrowers and
entrepreneurs that results in lower steady-state levels of capital accumula-
tion, output, and consumption. Secondly, the countercyclical pattern of such
markups increases the volatility of real variables and thus reduces welfare.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
The contestability of the retail banking sector is restricted by the requirement
that entrants must incur large sunk entry costs in highly segmented markets.
T h i si m p l i e st h a tt h eb a n k sm u s tc a p t u r eas i g n i ﬁcant fraction of the market
right after entering to make the entry proﬁtable. The idea of this paper
is that limit pricing strategies aimed at deterring competition in banking
retail niches are adopted when incumbents face an entry threat. During
recessions the actors in the local banking system are more able to exert
their monopolistic power, but boom periods lead to an expansion of the
ﬁnancial system that allows potential entrants to operate at an eﬃcient scale.
24Contestable markets force incumbents to lower markups so as to deter entry.
In turn, this generates countercyclical ﬁnancial markups.
Using annual aggregate bank data for a large set of countries for the
period 1990-2001, I ﬁnd that ﬁnancial markups are strongly countercyclical
even after controlling for simultaneity, ﬁnancial development, banking con-
centration, operating costs, and inﬂation. Since the threat of entry is a not
a measurable concept, I use foreign penetration as a proxy. I exploit the
evidence that foreign bank entry initially takes place in the wholesale mar-
ket with the intention to expand later to the retail niches. I ﬁnd that the
entry (and not the presence) of foreign banks is the omitted variable that
disentangles the cyclicality of the markups in the empirical models .
The modeling of the banking system captures several of the features of
the empirical evidence. In the theoretical model, entry occurs at the whole-
sale level and then spreads to the retail level. The retail market is highly
s e g m e n t e di n t on i c h e sa n dt h em o r ee ﬃcient entrants end up taking over
current incumbents. Entry is procyclical and more likely to occur in deregu-
lated markets, but is more eﬀective and successful if markets are regulated.
Changes in the market structure do not aﬀect the markups. Instead, the
markups change because the threat of entry forces incumbents to set rates
that deter entry. Finally, economies of scale facilitate entry in boom periods,
and vice versa, generating countercyclical markups. At a general equilibrium
level, the behavior of this imperfectly competitive ﬁnancial system generates
a bank-supply channel that increases the volatility of real variables, ampliﬁes
the business cycle, and reduces welfare. Credit is more expensive during re-
cessions, and ﬁrms and households postpone investment and work decisions,
thereby deepening the recession.
There are several extensions of the analysis that can be pursued in future
work. Not having access to bank-level disaggregated data was a consider-
able handicap for this study. For instance, it would be interesting to study
whether the regional markets that are more concentrated, or have a lower
degree of ﬁnancial development, or are more regulated, have diﬀerent cyclical
patterns. Additionally, the model could be extended to capture the conse-
quences of long-term relationships between banks and customers. Eﬃciency
gains from ﬁnancial liberalization and market de-segmentation may be oﬀset
by some important negative eﬀects not considered in this study. An exam-
ple is that regional banks are engaged in long-term relationships with small
domestic entrepreneurs that otherwise would have no access to the credit
market. Entry threats that force low margins can increase the degree of
25banking fragility and disrupt these relationships.
Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 1.
Deﬁne the break-even level of markups θi and θj for the incumbent and
the entrant. The break-even level is equal to the value of the net margin that






















N o w ,l e t ’ sa n a l y z et h ec a s ei nw h i c hυj > υi, and thus θj > θi.
Consider for example, Ξi
t+1 > Ξ
j
t+1 > θj. The bank i has no demand and
its proﬁts are zero. If bank i charges Ξi
t+1 = Ξ
j
t+1−ε (where ε is positive but
nil), it gets the entire niche and has a positive proﬁt Ξ
j
t+1 − ε − θi > 0.






t+1 > θj. In that case they share the niche, and each
one serves half of it. But if bank j reduces its price slightly to Ξ
j
t+1 − ε, it
gets all the niche. Nonetheless, bank j will never charge Ξ
j
t+1 < θj, because
it would make a negative proﬁt. It follows that bank i can charge Ξi
t+1 =
θj − ε and guarantee for itself all the niche while obtaining a positive proﬁt
θj − ε − θi > 0.
Therefore bank j is indiﬀerent between staying or leaving the niche, since
w i l ln o tb ea b l et os e r v ei t .I fb a n ki oﬀers bank j a negligible but positive
amount of output ε so as to merge, it is in the best interest of bank j to
accept it. A symmetric analysis holds when υj < υi.¥
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Table 2: Time Series Properties.  












































Sample: 124 Countries (1990-2000). 
-Year Dummies included in all models.   
-m1 and m2 are test for first and second order serial correlation for first-differenced residuals, asymptotically N (0, 1).  They are reported 
from the first-step estimations. 
-The Sargan test for over-identifying restrictions for the GMM estimators is asymptotically  .
2 χ   It is reported from the two-step 
estimations. 
-P- values are reported in parentheses. 
 
Table 3: Basic Model 
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Table 4: Sensitivity Analysis -GMM System Estimator-. 
 
Dependent Variable: Net Interest Margins ) ( t NIM  
    


































































































Table 5: Entry and the counter-cyclicality of the net interest margins -GMM System Estimator-. 
 
Dependent Variable: Net Interest Margins ) ( t NIM  
 
 


































     
 



















































Sample: 109 Countries (1990-2000). For further information, see notes to Table 2. 
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Table 6:  Standard Deviation 
 
VARIABLE RBC    ICFM 
Output 1.80  2.31 
Consumption 0.52  0.70 
Investment 5.74  12.08 
Capital 0.49  0.94 
Employment 1.37  2.19 
 
Notes: Theoretical second moments (as percentage deviations from steady-state values) are reported. RBC 
refers to the standard RBC model and ICFM to the monopolistic financial market setup. The method used was 
the frequency domain technique described in Uhlig (1999). The series are H-P filtered with a smoothness 
parameter of 1600 so that only the cyclical components remain.  
 
 
Table 7:  Relative Standard Deviation 
 
VARIABLE RBC    ICFM 
Output 1.00  1.00 
Consumption 0.29  0.30 
Investment 3.19  5.23 
Capital 0.28  0.41 
Employment 0.76  0.95 
 
Notes: Standard deviations relative to output. For further information, see notes to Table 6. 
 
 
Table 8:  Sensitivity Analysis 
 
VARIABLE  20 . 0 = τ   40 . 0 = τ   60 . 0 = τ   80 . 0 = τ  
Output 1.84  2.02  2.21  2.41 
Consumption 0.60  0.62  0.66  0.74 
Investment 8.24  9.67 11.26  12.89 
Capital 0.68  0.78  0.89  0.98 
Employment 1.43  1.71  2.03 2.35 
 




NIM: Net interest income minus interest over total assets (after subtracting defaulted loans). 
GROWTH: Annual growth rate of real GDP. 
PRIV. CREDIT.: Private Credit by deposit money banks to GDP calculated using the following 
deflation method: () [] {} [ ] t t et t et t a GDP P F P F / / / / * 5 . 0 1 1 − − +  
CONCENTRATION: Assets of the three largest banks as a share of the assets of all the commercial 
banks in the system. 
OVERCOSTS: Accounting value of a bank’s overhead costs as a share of its total assets. 
INFLATION: Annual inflation from the GDP deflator. 
REALRATE: Real interest rate. 
Foreign Banks: Number of foreign banks to total number of banks. A bank is defined to be a 
foreign bank if it has at least fifty percent foreign ownership. 
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Figure 2 
 
Percentage point response of the Monopolistic Financial Market (solid line), and RBC (dashed line) 
models’ to an unanticipated one percent decrease in technology. 